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RESTRUCTURE AND REFORM:  
POST-BP DEEPWATER HORIZON 
PROPOSALS TO IMPROVE  
OVERSIGHT OF OFFSHORE  
OIL AND GAS ACTIVITIES 
LEILA MONROE* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The explosion of the BP Deepwater Horizon on April 20, 2010, and 
the resulting catastrophic oil spill was not the first indication that federal 
oversight of offshore oil and gas activities was not adequate. With eleven 
people killed1 and over 62,000 barrels of oil spilled per day,2 this horrific 
event captured the attention of the public and decisionmakers and 
demanded immediate action to address the causes of the catastrophe. As 
those causes were examined, however, it became clear that the 
deficiencies in management, oversight, and response capabilities had 
* Staff Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council. Ms. Monroe works on a range of issues, 
including ocean governance, Coastal and Marine Spatial Planning, offshore oil and gas exploration 
and extraction, siting of ocean renewable energy, marine protected areas, and ocean pollution, 
particularly from land-based sources. Ms. Monroe received a Juris Doctor degree from Georgetown 
University Law Center, and from Georgetown’s School of Foreign Service, she earned a Bachelor of 
Science degree in Foreign Service with a focus on International Politics and Security Studies. 
 1 See NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING, 
FINAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: DEEP WATER, THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF 
OFFSHORE DRILLING 55 (Jan. 2011), available at www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/ 
default/files/documents/DEEPWATER_ReporttothePresident_FINAL.pdf [hereinafter REPORT OF 
NAT’L COMM’N]. 
 2 See NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING, 
STAFF WORKING PAPER NO. 3: THE AMOUNT AND FATE OF THE OIL 17 (Oct. 6, 2010, updated Jan. 
11, 2011), available at www.oilspillcommission.gov/resources#staff-working-papers (follow “The 
Amount and Fate of the Oil” link). 
1
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been known, to some extent, for years. Prior to the accident on the BP 
Deepwater Horizon offshore drilling rig, Congress, federal oversight 
bodies, media, and other observers had documented the failures of the 
U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI or “Department”), and its delegate, 
the Minerals Management Service (MMS), to effectively regulate and 
oversee lucrative Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) oil and gas activities. 
Even before the well was capped on July 15, 20103 – and the nearly three 
months of hydrocarbons gushing into the deep sea brought to an end – 
the Obama Administration and DOI Secretary Salazar ordered a number 
of investigations and reports to determine the causes of the accident and 
produce recommendations to remedy significant oversight flaws. 
This Article chronicles the multiple reviews that were conducted, in 
an attempt to understand the flaws in government management and 
oversight that allowed this disaster to occur. It endeavors to distill the 
key recommendations produced by numerous reviewers related to 
improving DOI’s management and oversight of offshore oil and gas 
exploration and development activities. Although they are also critically 
important topics, each with identified opportunities for improvement, it 
is not within the scope of this Article to provide an in-depth discussion of 
industry culture and practice, technological failures, oil spill response, or 
spill restoration. 
Part II of this Article discusses the troubled history of the Minerals 
Management Service under the DOI. Part III reviews the chronology of 
the BP Deepwater Horizon oversight structure reforms. Part IV examines 
necessary changes to address past failures in government regulation and 
oversight that contributed to the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster. With 
regard to reforming government management and oversight, four areas of 
change were identified by the multiple reports, investigations, and 
recommendations produced by an array of government agencies, task 
forces, panels, and experts examining the complex problems and 
necessary reform with DOI, MMS, and the regulations they administer. 
These multiple reviewers identified cross-cutting opportunities for deep, 
lasting improvements to U.S. oversight of offshore oil and gas activities. 
First, restructuring of DOI’s oversight agencies must create 
institutional structures that provide a solid firewall against the inherent 
conflict of interest between the Department’s revenue collection and 
resource management – including environmental protection – duties. 
Second, sufficient funding, staff, and technology must be available for 
regulators to keep pace with one of the most high-tech, risky, and 
 3 See Campbell Robertson & Henry Fountain, BP Says Oil Flow Has Stopped as Cap Is 
Tested, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2010, www.nytimes.com/2010/07/16/us/16spill.html. 
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lucrative industries in the world. Third, DOI must work much more 
closely with the federal natural resources and maritime safety agencies to 
improve tough oversight, availability of science, efficiency and sharing 
of resources. Fourth, the U.S. regulatory approach must be significantly 
improved to better manage risk and keep pace with rapid industry 
advances. 
This Article also examines actions that have been taken, as of the 
time of its writing (January 2011), by the Obama Administration and 
Congress to implement recommendations to improve government 
oversight of offshore oil and gas exploration and production. Some 
changes to the federal oversight structure were made by the 
Administration in the immediate wake of the spill, and other changes 
were implemented after the completion of reviews and issuance of 
recommendations. However, by the time the most comprehensive review 
was released, the Final Report of the presidentially authorized National 
Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore 
Drilling4 (“National Commission”), Congress had yet to pass any form 
of oil spill response bill, Administrative will to take bold and aggressive 
steps was flagging, and industry was voraciously attacking the validity of 
these well-supported recommendations for change.5 Industry opponents 
of change may succeed, as they have in the past, at halting any reforms 
that would slow the pace or increase the costs of offshore oil and gas 
exploration and production.6 
 
II. TROUBLED HISTORY OF U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR’S 
MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE 
The U.S. Department of the Interior and its delegate agency, the 
Minerals Management Service,7 had jurisdiction over 1.76 billion acres 
 4 See REPORT OF NAT’L COMM’N, supra note 1. 
 5 See Press Release, Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., Regulation and Enforcement, Director 
Bromwich Discusses Strengthened Oversight of Offshore Oil and Gas Drilling and Development at 
Gulf Oil Spill Series (Jan. 13, 2011), available at www.boemre.gov/ooc/press/2011/press0113.htm 
(claiming that the major challenge facing the United States and the industry is how to dramatically 
improve the safety of drilling, especially deepwater drilling, without negatively affecting the level of 
operations or the number of people working). 
 6 See REPORT OF NAT’L COMM’N, supra note 1, at 71. 
 7 Later referred to as the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and 
Enforcement. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, SECRETARIAL ORDER NO. 3299, ESTABLISHMENT 
OF THE BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MANAGEMENT, THE BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
ENFORCEMENT, AND THE OFFICE OF NATURAL RESOURCES REVENUE (May 19, 2010), available at 
www.doi.gov/deepwaterhorizon/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=32475 (revoking 
3
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of the OCS and primary oversight for offshore oil and gas development 
constituting “approximately thirty percent of domestically produced oil 
and eleven percent of the domestic natural gas supply.”8 Long before the 
explosion of the BP Deepwater Horizon on April 20, the Obama 
Administration, Secretary Salazar, and their predecessors were well 
aware of major problems in government management and oversight of 
offshore oil and gas activities.9 MMS was established administratively 
by Secretary of the Interior James Watt in 1982, and nearly from its 
inception, it was impacted by industry influence and conflicts of 
interest.10 Examples of past problems included pressure from MMS 
management to quickly process permit approvals and environmental 
reviews;11 failures to enforce safety and environmental requirements in 
spite of substantial violations;12 allowing industry self-regulation and 
monitoring (such as incorporation of American Petroleum Institute-
written standards into offshore operating regulations);13 flawed royalty 
contracts that cost the government an estimated $6.4 and $9.8 billion in 
the MMS’s duties and assigning them to two new bureaus and an office); see also U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
INTERIOR, SECRETARIAL ORDER NO. 3302, CHANGE OF THE NAME OF THE MINERALS 
MANAGEMENT SERVICE TO THE BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MANAGEMENT, REGULATION AND 
ENFORCEMENT (June 18, 2010), available at www.doi.gov/deepwaterhorizon/ 
loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=35872 (renaming the MMS as the Bureau of Ocean 
Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement). This transitional structure has led to some 
confusion; throughout this Article, each of the entities is referenced depending on the time of the 
relevant action and which agency had authority at that time. 
 8 U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., REPORT NO. X-SP-MOI-
0008-2010, INSPECTOR GENERAL’S STATEMENT SUMMARIZING THE MAJOR MANAGEMENT AND 
PERFORMANCE CHALLENGES FACING THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR 1 (Oct. 2010), available 
at www.doioig.gov/images/stories/reports/pdf/X-SP-MOI-0008-2010%20 
Performance%20Challenges.pdf. This report identified the “significant impediments to the 
Department's efforts to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in its bureaus' management 
and operations.” Id. OCS energy oversight is only one among eight categories of performance 
challenges identified, which also include financial management, information technology security, 
resource protection and restoration, and revenue collection. Id. 
 9 See Recent Departmental Actions to Improve Safety and Accountability on the Outer 
Continental Shelf: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 111th Cong. 
(2010) (statement of Ken Salazar, Sec’y of the Interior), available at www.boemre.gov/ooc/ 
PDFs/SalazarTestimony0609.pdf. 
 10 See CURRY L. HAGERTY & JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41262, 
DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL: SELECTED ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 26 (July 30, 2010), available at 
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41262.pdf. 
 11 See Juliet Eilperin, U.S. Oil Drilling Regulator Ignored Experts’ Red Flags on 
Environmental Risks, WASH. POST, May 25, 2010, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/05/24/AR2010052401974.html. 
 12 See Ian Urbina, BP Used Riskier Method to Seal Well Before Blast, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 
2010, www.nytimes.com/2010/05/27/us/27rig.html?hp=&adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1274954539-
+YOt1W2Q4Ea5oPc/pOZtBw. 
 13 See REPORT OF NAT’L COMM’N, supra note 1, at 225. 
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forgone revenues;14 serious flaws in auditing of production reports and 
royalty payments;15 graft, malfeasance, and widespread corruption 
among MMS personnel;16 and a “revolving door” where employees 
move between positions with industry and MMS.17 
After taking office, Secretary Salazar announced a program to 
address the problems raised by the Government Accountability Office 
and DOI Inspector General, addressing ethics standards, royalty policies 
and program oversight issues raised to ensure a fair return to taxpayers, 
and balancing the agency’s mission to include an aggressive offshore 
renewable energy component.18 Efforts to reform the agency between 
2009 and the BP Deepwater Horizon accident included issuance of new 
ethics guidelines and a new ethics code and program, elimination of the 
Royalty-in-Kind program and disciplinary actions against employees 
implicated in Inspector General investigations of that program, and 
proposal of certain new rules on safety systems and audit requirements.19 
A number of the investigations, especially by the National 
Commission, examined the iterative development of regulation.20 This 
history reveals striking patterns: periods of cozy industry-government 
collaboration and rapid development have been interrupted by disasters, 
which have led to a re-evaluation and adoption of stricter rules and 
 14 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-682T, ROYALTIES COLLECTION: 
ONGOING PROBLEMS WITH INTERIOR’S EFFORTS TO ENSURE A FAIR RETURN FOR TAXPAYERS 
REQUIRE ATTENTION 6 (Mar. 28, 2007), available at www.gao.gov/new.items/d07682t.pdf. 
 15 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-744, ROYALTY-IN-KIND PROGRAM: 
MMS DOES NOT PROVIDE REASONABLE ASSURANCE IT RECEIVES ITS SHARES OF GAS, RESULTING 
IN MILLIONS IN FORGONE REVENUE 10 (Aug. 2009), available at www.gao.gov/ 
new.items/d09744.pdf. 
 16 See Mark Clayton, US Rig Inspectors Received Gifts from Oil Companies, Report Says, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 25, 2010, www.csmonitor.com/USA/2010/0525/US-rig-inspectors-
received-gifts-from-oil-companies-report-says; see also Press Release, Dep’t of the Interior, 
Secretary of the Interior Salazar Asks IG to Investigate Whether Violations Persisted After 
Implementation of New Ethics Rules in 2009 (May 25, 2010), available at 
www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/IG-Report-MMS-Abuses-Yet-Another-Reason-to-Clean-
House.cfm. 
 17 See Frederic J. Frommer, Revolving Door Between BP and Its Regulator Getting More 
Attention, HUFFINGTON POST, May 26, 2010, www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/26/bp-revolving-
door-interior_n_591040.html?ref=email_share. 
 18 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, FACT SHEET: REFORMING MMS, JANUARY 2009-
PRESENT, available at www.doi.gov/deepwaterhorizon/upload/05-07-10-reform-fact-sheet.pdf. 
 19 U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, News Release, Salazar Ends Controversial Royalty in Kind 
Program, Launches Reforms to Management of Energy Resources on Public Lands, Outer 
Continental Shelf (Sept. 16, 2009), available at fossil.energy.gov/programs/reserves/spr/ 
DOI_Release_-_Salazar_Ends_Controversial.pdf. 
 20 See REPORT OF NAT’L COMM’N, supra note 1 at 68-76. 
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regulations.21 Industry then protests the heightened oversight and the 
identified necessary changes are either ignored, deferred, or significantly 
weakened.22 
III. CHRONOLOGY OF BP DEEPWATER HORIZON REVIEWS AND 
OVERSIGHT STRUCTURE REFORMS 
This Part reviews the government-initiated actions intended to 
identify the root causes of the BP Deepwater Horizon accident. This 
review focuses primarily on failures of government oversight and 
recommendations for improving federal agency structure and oversight.23 
Ten days after the explosion of the BP Deepwater Horizon, on April 
30, 2010, Secretary Salazar issued Order No. 3298 to establish the Outer 
Continental Shelf Safety Oversight Board, with the purpose to “ensure a 
timely, high-level review and implementation, as appropriate, of 
recommendations to address the Department’s current and future 
responsibility for management and administration of the OCS 
program.”24 The OCS Safety Oversight Board – composed of the 
Assistant Secretaries for Policy, Management Budget and Land Minerals 
Management and the Inspector General – was charged with providing 
oversight, support, resources and recommendations to MMS regarding 
the “Joint Investigation into the marine casualty, explosion, fire, 
pollution, and sinking of mobile offshore drilling unit BP Deepwater 
Horizon, with loss of life in the Gulf of Mexico, 21-22 April, 2010.”25 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. at 71. 
 23 For example, on May 14, 2010, the Council on Environmental Quality and the DOI 
announced a review of the former MMS’s application of NEPA. CEQ, REPORT REGARDING THE 
MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE’S NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT POLICIES, 
PRACTICES, AND PROCEDURES AS THEY RELATE TO OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL AND GAS 
EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT (Aug. 16, 2010), available at www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/ 
files/microsites/ceq/20100816-ceq-mms-ocs-nepa.pdf. The National Academy of Engineering and 
National Research Council also conducted a review of the blowout and ways to prevent such events. 
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING/NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL (NAE/NRC) COMMITTEE, 
ANALYSIS OF CAUSES OF THE DEEPWATER HORIZON EXPLOSION, FIRE, AND OIL SPILL TO IDENTIFY 
MEASURES TO PREVENT SIMILAR ACCIDENTS IN THE FUTURE, INTERIM REPORT (Nov. 16, 2010), 
www8.nationalacademies.org/cp/projectview.aspx?key=49246. The topics of those reviews are 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
 24 U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, SECRETARIAL ORDER NO. 3298, ESTABLISHMENT OF THE 
OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF SAFETY OVERSIGHT BOARD (Apr. 30, 2010), available at 
www.doi.gov/news/doinews/upload/Order-3298.pdf. 
 25 DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR & DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., JOINT DEPARTMENT OF THE 
INTERIOR AND DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES AND 
CONVENING ORDER REGARDING INVESTIGATION INTO THE MARINE CASUALTY, EXPLOSION, FIRE, 
POLLUTION, AND SINKING OF MOBILE OFFSHORE DRILLING UNIT DEEPWATER HORIZON, WITH LOSS 
6
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The Joint Investigation was conducted according to principles and a 
convening order between DOI and the Department of Homeland 
Security. The investigation was performed under the authority of the 
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA)26, and in accordance with a 
Memorandum of Agreement for conducting investigations.27 Multiple 
extensions were granted to the Joint Investigation Team; the report is 
expected to be completed July 27, 2011.28 The Joint Investigation is 
focusing on operations, manning, maintenance and preparedness causes 
and the responsibility for each held by the Operator (BP), drilling 
contractor (Transocean), Flag State (RMI), and Coastal State 
(MMS/USCG).29 
On April 30, 2010, the President also directed Secretary Salazar to 
conduct a thorough review of this event and to report, within thirty days, 
on what, if any, additional precautions and technologies should be 
required to improve the safety of oil and gas exploration and production 
operations on the OCS.30 The report responding to that order was 
produced on May 27, 2010.31 
On May 12, 2010, the Obama Administration submitted oil spill 
response legislation to Congress “proposing to change the thirty-day 
congressionally-mandated deadline to a 90-day timeline that can be 
further extended to complete additional environmental and safety 
reviews, as needed.”32 This legislative proposal was designed to respond 
OF LIFE IN THE GULF OF MEXICO, 21-22 APRIL 2010 (Apr. 27, 2010), available at 
www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/upload/DHS-DOI-statemet_Deepwater-Horizon-investigaton.pdf. 
 26 43 U.S.C.A. § 1348 (Westlaw 2011). 
 27 See MINERALS MGMT. SERV. & U.S. COAST GUARD, MMS/USCG MOA: OCS-05, 
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE – U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND THE U.S. COAST GUARD – U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. 
(Mar. 27, 2009), available at www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/external/content/document/ 
3043/552571/1/USCG_MMS_MOA.pdf. 
 28 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior & U.S. Coast Guard, Deepwater Horizon 
Joint Investigation Team Announces Extended Deadline for Final Report (Oct. 22, 2010), available 
at www.deepwaterinvestigation.com (extension was requested to allow time for forensic testing and 
public hearing based on that forensic evidence). 
 29 See U.S. COAST GUARD & BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., REGULATION AND 
ENFORCEMENT, JOINT USCG-BOEMRE INVESTIGATION ROADMAP, DETERMINING THE CAUSES OF 
THE DEEPWATER HORIZON CASUALTY AND IMPROVING THE SAFETY NET FOR MODUS OPERATING 
ON THE OCS (Aug. 3, 2010), available at www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/external/content/ 
document/3043/590203/1/JIT%20Deepwater%20Horizon%20Investigation%20Roadmap.pdf. 
 30 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Salazar Calls for New Safety Measures for 
Offshore Oil and Gas Operations; Orders Six Month Moratorium on Deepwater Drilling (May 27, 
2010), available at www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Salazar-Calls-for-New-Safety-Measures-for-
Offshore-Oil-and-Gas-Operations-Orders-Six-Month-Moratorium-on-Deepwater-Drilling.cfm 
 31 Id. 
 32 Press Release, Dep’t of the Interior, Interior Issues Directive to Guide Safe, Six-Month 
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to MMS’s need for more time to review exploration plans.33 
The Administration acted very quickly in announcing the intent to 
reform the agency with the primary responsibility for oversight off 
offshore oil and gas, in response to the BP Deepwater Horizon 
catastrophe. On May 19, 2010, Secretary Salazar issued Secretarial Order 
3299 separating and reassigning the responsibilities previously 
performed by MMS into two new bureaus and one new office, in an 
effort to separate their potentially conflicting duties.34 These offices are 
the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM), responsible for 
resource evaluation, planning, and other activities related to leasing; the 
Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE), responsible 
for creation of standards, inspections, and enforcement of safety and 
environmental protection regulations; and the Office of Natural 
Resources and Revenue (ONRR), responsible for the collection, 
distribution, and management of revenue. The structure and 
responsibilities of each of these entities was fleshed out over the course 
of the following year, with ONRR receiving its direction and 
responsibilities on October 1, 2010, BOEM and BSEE receiving more 
detail on their mandates on January 19, 2011, and the details of the new 
structure to be worked out through 2011.35 
President Obama announced on May 22, 2010, the creation of the 
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and 
Offshore Drilling (National Commission), “an independent, nonpartisan 
entity, directed to provide a thorough analysis and impartial judgment. 
The President charged the Commission to determine the causes of the 
disaster, and to improve the country’s ability to respond to spills, and to 
recommend reforms to make offshore energy production safer.”36 
The National Commission released its comprehensive report eight 
months later, on January 12, 2011, and that report is discussed in detail in 
Part IV below. 
A few days after the creation of the National Commission, on May 
27, 2010, Secretary Salazar submitted to the President a report 
responding to the Executive request for identification of immediate, 
Moratorium on Deepwater Drilling (May 30, 2010), available at www.doi.gov/news/ 
pressreleases/Interior-Issues-Directive-to-Guide-Safe-Six-Month-Moratorium-on-Deepwater-
Drilling.cfm. 
 33 Id. 
 34 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, SECRETARIAL ORDER NO. 3299, supra note 7. 
 35 DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, FACT SHEET: THE BSEE AND BOEM SEPARATION, AN 
INDEPENDENT SAFETY, ENFORCEMENT AND OVERSIGHT MISSION (Jan. 19, 2011), available at 
www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=119590. 
 36 REPORT OF NAT’L COMM’N, supra note 1, at vi. 
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short- and long-term measures that DOI should take to improve safety of 
energy development on the OCS. The report recommended a number of 
specific safety measures for blowout preventers and well control, 
improvements that could be made to the culture of safety through 
operational and personnel management, and “prescriptive near-term 
requirements, longer-term performance-based safety measures, and one 
or more Department-led working groups to evaluate longer-term safety 
issues.”37 Based on this report, Secretary Salazar determined that safety 
required that deepwater drilling activities on new wells cease while 
additional reviews were being conducted. Thus, on May 28 he issued a 
memorandum ordering suspension of OCS drilling on new deepwater 
wells, and two days later he released a Moratorium Notice to Lessees and 
Operators (“Moratorium NTL”) 38 directing oil and gas lessees and 
operators to cease drilling new deepwater wells, including wellbore 
sidetrack and bypass activities; prohibiting the spudding of any new 
deepwater wells; and putting oil and gas lessees and operators on notice 
that, with certain exceptions, MMS will not consider for six months 
drilling permits for deepwater wells and for related activities. For the 
purposes of the Moratorium NTL, “deepwater” means depths greater 
than 500 feet.39 
On June 18, 2010, Secretary Salazar issued Secretarial Order 3302 
formally eliminating the former MMS and creating the Bureau of Ocean 
Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE or 
“Bureau”).40 On June 23, 2010, DOI announced the creation of the 
Investigations and Review Unit (IRU), which according to BOEMRE 
Director Bromwich, “will provide us the capacity to investigate 
allegations of misconduct, to provide unified and coordinated monitoring 
of compliance with laws and regulations, and to respond swiftly to 
 37 U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, INCREASED SAFETY MEASURES FOR ENERGY 
DEVELOPMENT ON THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF, Exec. Summary (May 27, 2010), available at 
www.doi.gov/deepwaterhorizon/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=33598. 
 38 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, NTL No. 2010-N04, NOTICE TO LESSEES AND 
OPERATORS OF FEDERAL OIL AND GAS LEASES IN THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF REGIONS OF 
THE GULF OF MEXICO AND THE PACIFIC TO IMPLEMENT THE DIRECTIVE TO IMPOSE A MORATORIUM 
ON ALL DRILLING OF DEEPWATER WELLS (May 30, 2010), available at 
www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=33716. There was 
some concern that the Executive Summary of U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 37, which 
imposed the Moratorium, inappropriately described peer review conducted by the National Academy 
of Engineering. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., INVESTIGATIVE 
REPORT: FEDERAL MORATORIUM ON DEEPWATER DRILLING (Nov. 8, 2010), available at 
www.doioig.gov/images/stories/reports/pdf/DeepwaterMoratoriumPublic.pdf. 
 39 Dep’t of the Interior, supra note 28; see also Hornbeck Offshore Servs. v. Salazar, 696 F. 
Supp. 2d 627 (E.D. La. 2010) (industry challenge to the moratorium successful). 
 40 U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, SECRETARIAL ORDER NO. 3302, supra note 7. 
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emerging and urgent issues on a Bureau-wide level and in the 
industry.”41 The IRU is intended to respond to possible misconduct and 
unethical behavior by Bureau employees; pursue alleged misconduct by 
oil and gas companies involved in offshore energy projects; quickly 
respond to emerging issues and crises, including significant incidents 
such as spills and accidents; and share information about misconduct or 
crises with the DOI’s Office of Inspector General, then jointly determine 
which office will conduct any investigation.42 
On July 14, 2010, DOI released an implementation report to 
describe the status of the reorganization of the Minerals Management 
Service.43 This report provided some detail about the intended purpose of 
each of the three departments that succeeded MMS. The report states that 
the plan for implementation balances “the need for an expedited 
transition with the extensive analysis and planning required to 
successfully implement an organizational change of this scope and 
complexity.”44 
On September 1, 2010, the OCS Safety Oversight Board produced a 
report for Secretary Salazar, “providing recommendations to improve 
and strengthen the Department’s overall management, regulation, and 
oversight of OCS operations, including undertaking further audits or 
reviews, and reviewing existing authorities and procedures.”45 The 
Oversight Board was an internal DOI review mechanism; it consisted of 
the Assistant Secretary for Land and Minerals Management, the Interior 
Department Inspector General, and the Assistant Secretary for Policy 
 41 Press Release, Dep’t of the Interior, Bromwich Launches Investigative/Compliance Team 
to Spur Reform, Restructuring of Offshore Oil and Gas Regulation (June 23, 2010), available at 
www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Bromwich-Launches-Investigative-Compliance-Team-to-Spur-
Reform-Restructuring-of-Offshore-Oil-and-Gas-Regulation.cfm. 
 42 See Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., Regulation and Enforcement, Investigations and 
Review Unit, BOEMRE.GOV, www.boemre.gov/iru/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2011) (offering hotlines 
for “[a]nyone with knowledge of misconduct or unethical behavior involving the Bureau” to submit 
a report). 
 43 U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, IMPLEMENTATION REPORT OF REORGANIZATION OF THE 
MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE (July 14, 2010), available at www.doi.gov/deepwaterhorizon/ 
loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=38543%20 [hereinafter REORGANIZATION 
IMPLEMENTATION REPORT]. In some DOI materials, this report is referred to as the Implementation 
Plan, although this is distinct from the SAFETY OVERSIGHT REPORT IMPLEMENTATION PLAN cited 
infra at note 47. 
 44 Id. at 6. 
 45 U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF SAFETY OVERSIGHT BD., 
REPORT TO SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR KEN SALAZAR 1 (Sep. 1, 2010), available at 
www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=43677 
[hereinafter OCS SAFETY OVERSIGHT REPORT]. 
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Management and Budget.46 
On September 4, 2010, Director Bromwich submitted to Secretary 
Salazar the Implementation Plan of Bureau of Ocean Energy 
Management, Regulation and Enforcement in response to the Report of 
the OCS Safety Oversight Board. Director Bromwich explained to 
Secretary Salazar that the Implementation Plan contains information 
about how most of the recommendations in the OCS Safety Oversight 
Board Report were already being addressed by the reorganization of the 
agencies.47 Given that a number of in-depth investigations were still 
months away from releasing their recommendations, this stated approach 
calls into question the extent to which BOEMRE was really willing to go 
to eradicate the deepest flaws in government oversight. 
In a move to separate revenue collection activities from the mineral 
leasing and regulatory functions on October 1, 2010, the Office of 
Natural Resources Revenue (ONRR) authority over revenue collection 
functions was officially transferred from BOEMRE to the Assistant 
Secretary for Policy Management and Budget.48 ONRR was given duties 
for management of: 
[R]evenues from Federal and Indian onshore and offshore mineral and 
energy resource leases, and other mineral and energy resource 
development arrangements and activities not subject to the mining 
laws, to assure full and timely collection, distribution, and 
disbursement of bonuses, rentals, royalties, and other revenues and 
coordination of related Departmental policy.49 
The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and 
Enforcement created eleven Implementation Teams to direct the process 
of reforming the agencies.50 According to Director Bromwich, the teams 
 46 Id. 
 47 See MICHAEL R. BROMWICH, DIR., BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., REGULATION 
AND ENFORCEMENT, IMPLEMENTATION PLAN IN RESPONSE TO THE OCS SAFETY OVERSIGHT 
BOARD’S SEPTEMBER 1, 2010 REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, intro. letter 6 (Sep. 4, 
2010), available at www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/loader.cfm?csModule=security/ 
getfile&PageID=43879 [hereinafter SAFETY OVERSIGHT REPORT IMPLEMENTATION PLAN]. 
 48 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, SECRETARIAL ORDER NO. 3306, ORGANIZATIONAL 
CHANGES UNDER THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY – POLICY, MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET (Sep. 30, 
2010), available at www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/loader.cfm?csModule=security/ 
getfile&PageID=46102; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Interior Establishes Office 
of Natural Resources Revenue (Oct. 1, 2010), available at www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Interior-
Establishes-Office-of-Natural-Resources-Revenue.cfm. 
 49 See id. 
 50 See Bureau of Ocean Energy Management Plans for Regulating Oil Drilling: Hearing 
Before the National Comm. on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, 111th Cong. (2010) (statement 
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considered the recommendations for improvement received from sources 
including the report and conversations with the National Oil Spill 
Commission, the report of the National Academy of Engineering, and the 
report of the Safety Oversight Board commissioned by Secretary 
Salazar.51 
Throughout the fall and winter of 2010, the staff of the National 
Commission released a number of reports, and the National Commission 
released its final report on January 11, 2011. The report included many 
recommended changes to Federal laws, regulations, and oversight 
structure discussed in more detail below. The National Commission also 
made recommendations to address industry practices and other aspects of 
oil spill response not explored in this Article. 
IV. NECESSARY CHANGES TO ADDRESS FAILURES IN GOVERNMENT 
REGULATION AND OVERSIGHT CONTRIBUTING TO THE BP 
DEEPWATER HORIZON DISASTER 
The blowout was not the product of a series of aberrational decisions 
made by rogue industry or government officials that could not have 
been anticipated or expected to occur again. Rather, the root causes 
are systemic and, absent significant reform in both industry practices 
and government policies, might well recur. The missteps were rooted 
in systemic failures by industry management (extending beyond BP to 
contractors that serve many in the industry), and also by failures of 
government to provide effective regulatory oversight of offshore 
drilling.52 
This Part reviews those failures of government oversight identified 
by the multiple bodies and experts that investigated the causes of the BP 
Deepwater Horizon tragedy. Some other problems underlying that 
catastrophe, such as industry culture and practice or flaws in oil spill 
response preparedness and technology, are beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
Various reviews of the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster produced 
dozens of specific recommendations for improving management and 
of Michael Bromwich, Director, BOEMRE); see also Press Release, Bureau of Ocean Energy 
Mgmt., Regulation and Enforcement, BOEMRE Director Testifies Before the National Commission 
on the DP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill (Nov. 9, 2010), available at 
www.boemre.gov/ooc/press/2010/press1109.htm. 
 51 See Press Release, Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., Regulation and Enforcement, supra 
note 5. 
 52 REPORT OF NAT’L COMM’N, supra note 1, at 122. 
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oversight of U.S. offshore oil and gas exploration and production. This 
Article discusses four general recommendations that are cross-cutting 
and identified by multiple reviewers as being necessary for deep, lasting 
improvements to U.S. oversight of offshore oil and gas activities: (1) 
restructuring of DOI’s oversight agencies must eliminate the inherent 
conflict of interest between revenue collection and oversight activities; 
(2) sufficient funding, staff, and technology must be available for 
regulators to keep pace with industry; (3) agencies must work together to 
improve tough oversight, availability of science, efficiency and sharing 
of resources; and (4) the U.S. regulatory approach must be improved to 
better manage risk and keep pace with rapid industry advances. 
These are not the only recommendations identified by the various 
commissions, reviews, and experts consulted, and this analysis does not 
provide significant detail about the reforms proposed. This Article 
attempts to synthesize those recommendations that appeared most 
frequently and appear to be the greatest priority with regard to improving 
government oversight of offshore oil and gas activities. 
A.  CONFLICTING AGENCY MANDATES NECESSITATE SIGNIFICANT 
RESTRUCTURING, TOUGH FIREWALLS, AND EXTERNAL REVIEW 
The 1978 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments 
(OCSLA) gave DOI and its delegate, the Minerals Management Service, 
four distinct – and often conflicting – responsibilities: to manage 
offshore leasing, to collect revenue and conduct auditing, to ensure 
appropriate permitting and operational safety, and to protect the natural 
resources on the OCS.53  Each of these responsibilities requires different 
skill sets and cultures, and since its creation, MMS has been torn in two 
conflicting directions by these competing mandates. 54 
The revenue generated from energy activities on the OCS is 
tremendously important to the federal government, so it is easy to 
understand how the pressure to issue leases quickly and in large numbers 
would outweigh careful environmental review and strict oversight of 
 53 See Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 629 (1978); see also 
REPORT OF NAT’L COMM’N, supra note 1, at 67. 
 54 See REPORT OF NAT’L COMM’N, supra note 1, at 56 (“The origins of MMS vividly 
illustrate that political compromise. Secretary of the Interior James Watt created the agency with 
great fanfare in January 1982, aiming from the outset to promote domestic energy supplies by 
dramatically expanding drilling on the OCS. He combined, in one entity, authority for regulatory 
oversight with responsibility for collecting for the U.S. Treasury the billions of dollars of revenues 
obtained from lease sales and royalty payments from producing wells. From birth, MMS had a built-
in incentive to promote offshore drilling in sharp tension with its mandate to ensure safe drilling and 
environmental protection.”). 
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agency activities: 
Since 1953, the Federal Government has received approximately $200 
billion in lease bonuses, fees, and royalty payments from OCS oil and 
gas operators. Last year, the Federal OCS leasing revenue was $6 
billion. The OCS oil and gas industry provides relatively high-paying 
jobs in drilling and production activities, as well as employment in 
supporting industries. Offshore operations provide direct employment 
estimated at 150,000 jobs.55 
Close ties between MMS and industry resulted in many instances of 
the oversight agency giving the industry significant discounts, or 
shortchanging taxpayers, for the extraction of public resources.56 This 
pervasive problem is identified by the National Commission as occurring 
from the very first years of the MMS leasing program.57 MMS’s practice 
of opening large areas of the OCS to be leased had the effect of reducing 
rents received for leases: “Secretary Watt’s plans for accelerated leasing 
would cost the U.S. Treasury $77 billion over the five-year period.”58 
The conflicting mandates require fundamental reforms “in both the 
structure of those in charge of regulatory oversight and their internal 
decision-making process to ensure their political autonomy, technical 
expertise, and their full consideration of environmental protection 
concerns.”59 A number of recommendations emerged to address this 
tension within the Minerals Management Service, and its successor 
agencies, BOEM, BSEE, and ONRR. 
In the wake of the BP Deepwater Horizon explosion, the 
Administration acknowledged that MMS suffered from conflicts between 
its resource management, safety and environmental oversight and 
enforcement, and revenue collection mandates.60 Thus, the Department 
moved quickly to reassign these responsibilities into three new entities 
within DOI. While this reorganization was a step in the right direction, 
reviewers expressed concern that it “does not adequately address the 
 55 U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 37, at 4 (referencing Minerals Management 
Service Database 2010). 
 56 See Jason DeParle, Minerals Service Had a Mandate to Produce Results, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 7, 2010, www.nytimes.com/2010/08/08/us/08mms.html; see also Elliott A. Norse & John 
Amos, Impacts, Perception, and Policy Implications of the Deepwater Horizon Oil and Gas 
Disaster, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 11058, 11070 (2010). 
 57 REPORT OF NAT’L COMM’N, supra note 1, at 65 (quoting the Sierra Club’s estimates in 
Interior Denies Oil Leasing Plan Will Cost $77 Billion, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sep. 28, 1982). 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. at vii. 
 60 See REORGANIZATION IMPLEMENTATION REPORT, supra note 43, at 2. 
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deeper problem of fully insulating the Department’s safety and 
environmental protection functions from the pressures to increase 
production and maximize lease revenues.”61 Although the restructuring 
included the creation of a Chief Environmental Officer position, the new 
structure maintains within the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management 
(BOEM) both the authority to issue leases and to perform environmental 
review and planning decisions.62 
B.  REMEDY MMS LACK OF SUFFICIENT FUNDING, STAFF, AND 
TECHNICAL RESOURCES 
A cross-cutting theme identified in various reviews was that the lack 
of sufficient funding or staff with the right training, education, 
management commitment, motivation and technical resources (laptops) 
significantly undermined the ability of DOI to provide effective 
management and oversight. Lack of funding and sufficient resources was 
identified by multiple reviewers as the cause of numerous problems, 
including inability to recruit and retain the best staff, vulnerability of 
staff to industry capture, and inability of staff to keep up with the 
workload. Reviews conducted by both the OCS Safety Oversight Board 
and the National Commission identified the dramatic increase in 
workload without a commensurate increase in MMS resources as a 
significant problem.63 
The OCS Safety Oversight Board identified lack of sufficient 
funding and staffing, and the need for more personnel and training, 
education, and professional growth and development opportunities for 
them as significant problems undermining federal oversight of OCS 
energy extraction activities.64 The National Commission called the 
situation “safety regulation on a starvation diet”65 and noted that MMS 
would “increasingly struggle to keep up with the pace of industry 
expansion, while juggling four distinct responsibilities – offshore leasing, 
revenue collection and auditing, permitting and operational safety, and 
environmental protection – requiring different skill sets and cultures.”66 
 61 REPORT OF NAT’L COMM’N, supra note 1, at 255. 
 62 See Dep’t of the Interior, supra note 28. 
 63 See OCS SAFETY OVERSIGHT REPORT, supra note 45, at 6; see also REPORT OF NAT’L 
COMM’N, supra note 1, at 72, 256-57. 
 64 See OCS SAFETY OVERSIGHT REPORT, supra note 45, at 4-5. 
 65 REPORT OF NAT’L COMM’N, supra note 1, at 72. 
 66 Id. at 67 (“The root problem has instead been that political leaders within both the 
Executive Branch and Congress have failed to ensure that agency regulators have had the resources 
necessary to exercise that authority, including personnel and technical expertise, and, no less 
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Without sufficient funding, the regulators were not able to keep pace 
with technological and industry advancements. 
In one of his multiple testimonies to the National Commission, 
Director Bromwich explained the work the agency was doing to achieve 
reform: 
We are also taking steps to secure additional funding and resources for 
BOEMRE and its successor agencies. . . . Central to this effort is 
encouraging congressional approval of additional funding and 
resources for BOEMRE and its successor agencies as we implement 
the reorganization. The Administration recently submitted a FY 2011 
Budget Amendment requesting a $100 million increase for BOEMRE 
operations funding to facilitate reorganization and reform of the 
agency.67 
Implementation of many of the identified recommendations and 
pledged reform is primarily dependent on the availability of additional 
resources, specifically funding and personnel.68 
Despite the importance of securing sustained and sufficient funding 
for federal oversight activities, there has been fierce political opposition 
to attempts to increase agency funding. A proposal, consistent with the 
recommendations of the National Commission,69 to raise fees on oil and 
gas operators to better cover the costs of hiring new rig inspectors, 
conducting scientific research, and finalizing the reform of the oversight 
agency was criticized strongly by Republican lawmakers and the 
industry. These critiques claimed the fees would drive offshore oil and 
gas operations overseas.70 
important, the political autonomy needed to overcome the powerful commercial interests that have 
opposed more stringent safety regulation.”). 
 67 Press Release, Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., Regulation and Enforcement, supra note 5 
(BOEMRE provided “staff with nearly one thousand documents, totaling over 15,000 pages, and 
approximately 30 interviews, briefings and meetings detailing the Bureau’s historical functions and 
programs.”). 
 68 E.g., SAFETY OVERSIGHT REPORT IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, supra note 47, at 12 (“These 
recommendations are directly tied to the infusion of additional resources into the Bureaus safety and 
enforcement program, including the hiring and distribution of new personnel and enhancements to 
the Bureau’s information technology infrastructure.”). 
 69 REPORT OF NAT’L COMM’N, supra note 1 at 256-57. 
 70 See Phil Taylor, Battle Brews over Interior Bid to Increase Regulatory Fees for Offshore 
Drilling Projects, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2011, www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/01/21/21greenwire-
battle-brews-over-interior-bid-to-increase-reg-81926.html. 
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C.  IMPROVE CONTENT AND UNIFORM APPLICATION OF REGULATIONS 
AND ENFORCEMENT 
The development of offshore oil and gas management and oversight 
structures has been iterative; major accidents have resulted in staged 
reforms and improvement of regulations and oversight. Industry and 
government have a long history of working very closely together to 
advance drilling: reforms proposed in the wake of a disaster were 
frequently not fully realized. Government incentives have enabled the 
expansion of development deeper and deeper, and the industry has 
continued to expand and grow.71 
Just over a month after the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster, 
Secretary Salazar fulfilled President Obama’s April 30, 2010, request for 
a thirty-day review of additional precautions and technologies that could 
improve the safety of OCS oil and gas exploration and production. Even 
while the well was still gushing, and the causes of disaster were still 
being investigated, DOI identified numerous necessary improvements to 
enhance enforcement of current regulations; improve safety management 
systems, procedures, and operations; and institute new rules requiring a 
comprehensive, systems-based approach to safety and environmental 
management.72 The extent of the problems identified and changes needed 
were so significant that Secretary Salazar called for a six-month 
moratorium on new permits and drilling activities in the OCS.73 
i.  U.S. Regulations Need Significant and Ongoing Improvement 
As more information was gathered and additional reviews 
conducted, the extent to which regulations have not kept pace with 
technological advances was brought into sharp relief. J. Robinson West, 
former Assistant Secretary of the Interior and current industry consultant, 
stated in testimony to the National Commission, “[T]he fundamental 
challenge all regulators face is the potential mismatch between very 
dynamic business processes and static regulatory systems.”74 
Analysis of the flaws with the U.S. system led to consideration of 
offshore oil and gas in regulation and reforms in other nations around the 
 71 See REPORT OF NAT’L COMM’N, supra note 1, at 68-72. 
 72 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 37. 
 73 Id. 
 74 History and Expansion of Offshore Drilling: Hearing Before the National Comm. on the 
BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, 111th Cong. 5 (2010) (statement of J. 
Robinson West), available at www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ 
Robinson%20West%20Written%20Statement.pdf. 
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world.75 Numerous post-BP Deepwater Horizon reviewers discussed the 
differences between the U.S. regulatory system and the approaches 
applied in the United Kingdom and Norway, which have moved away 
from a prescriptive regulatory approach to a performance-based 
approach.76 Regulatory systems are typically categorized as falling into 
one of three groups: (1) prescriptive, applied in the United States and 
focusing on detailed regulations and requirements; (2) self-regulation, in 
nations, such as Angola, that lack capacity or will to substantially 
oversee industry; and (3) performance-based or “safety case” approaches 
that focus on a flexible, yet arguably more effective, risk management 
structure, such as those in the United Kingdom, Norway, Australia and 
Canada.77 
Secretary Salazar acknowledged the need to adopt a safety case 
approach, based on the guidelines applied by the International 
Association of Drilling Contractors, that would “establish risk 
assessment and mitigation processes to manage a drilling contractor’s 
controls related to the health, safety, and environmental aspects of their 
operations,” and to finalize a Safety and Environmental Management 
System for offshore drilling operations.78 At first glance, this was a 
demonstration of meaningful commitment to reforms, but the Report of 
the National Commission reveals that the Norwegian, British and 
Canadian governments adopted such an approach in the early 1990s, and 
MMS had been instructed by the Marine Board of the National Research 
Council of the need to conduct such a regulatory overhaul.79 “At the time 
of the Macondo blowout—almost 20 years after its original proposal—
MMS had still not published a rule mandating that all operators have 
plans to manage safety and environmental risks.”80 
The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and 
Enforcement has demonstrated resolve to implement a number of safety 
and environmental measures.81 These include the Drilling Safety Rule, 
 75 See REPORT OF NAT’L COMM’N, supra note 1, at 69 -71. 
 76 See Christopher F. Richardson, The Influence of Offshore Leasing Regimes on Commercial 
Oil Activity: An Empirical Analysis of Property Rights in the Gulf of Mexico and the North Sea, 17 
GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 97, 103-04, (2004); see also U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 
37, at 10. 
 77 Statement of J. Robinson West, supra note 74. Comparisons of regulatory approaches in 
Norway, United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada are also available in U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, 
supra note 37, at 15-16, and REPORT OF NAT’L COMM’N, supra note 1, at 68-72. 
 78 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 37, at 27-28. 
 79 See REPORT OF NAT’L COMM’N, supra note 1, at 69-71. 
 80 Id. at 71. 
 81 See Press Release, Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., Regulation and Enforcement, supra 
note 5. 
18
Golden Gate University Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/gguelj/vol5/iss1/4
03_MONROE PRINTER VERSION 9/24/2011  6:35:21 PM 
2011 OFFSHORE EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT 79 
 
containing new standards for well design; casing and cementing and 
requiring operators to obtain independent third-party inspection and 
certification of each stage of the proposed drilling process; and the 
Workplace Safety Rule, which requires operators to develop a 
comprehensive safety and environmental management program that 
identifies the potential hazards and risk-reduction strategies for all phases 
of activity, from well design and construction, to operation and 
maintenance, and finally to the decommissioning of platforms.82  
BOEMRE also issued new Notices to Lessees (NTL): NTL-06, which 
requires that operators’ oil spill response plans include a well-specific 
blowout and worst-case discharge scenario and that operators also 
provide the assumptions and calculations behind these scenarios;83 and 
NTL-10, which establishes informational requirements, including a 
corporate statement from the operator that it will conduct the applied-for 
drilling operation in compliance with all applicable agency regulations, 
including the new Drilling Safety Rule.84 
Although these are improvements over the pre-BP Deepwater 
Horizon requirements, the new regulations and rules are still based on 
American Petroleum Institute (API) practice. For example, according to 
the National Commission, the Workplace Safety Rule—based on the 
Safety and Environmental Management Program Recommended Practice 
75 developed in 1993 by the API and incorporated by reference into the 
rule—needs updating immediately to be sufficient.85 
Even these modest measures have faced fierce industry opposition. 
For example, media reported that offshore oil and gas industry groups 
have expressed strong opposition to the changes, bombarding DOI and 
the Administration with critiques.86  In two weeks in January 2011, 
industry representatives met with Director Bromwich and his staff in 
Washington, D.C., to strongly express their concern about delays to new 
 82 See Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf – Safety and 
Environmental Management Systems, 75 Fed. Reg. 63,610 (Oct.15, 2010). 
 83 See BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT, NTL NO. 
2010-N06, INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS FOR EXPLORATION PLANS, DEVELOPMENT AND 
PRODUCTION PLANS, AND DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS COORDINATION DOCUMENTS ON THE OCS 
(June 18, 2010), available at gomr.boemre.gov/homepg/regulate/regs/ntls/2010NTLs/10-n06.pdf. 
 84 See BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT, NTL NO. 
2010-N10, STATEMENT OF COMPLIANCE WITH APPLICABLE REGULATIONS AND EVALUATION OF 
INFORMATION DEMONSTRATING ADEQUATE SPILL RESPONSE AND WELL CONTAINMENT 
RESOURCES (Nov. 8, 2010), available at gomr.boemre.gov/homepg/regulate/regs/ntls/2010NTLs/10-
n10.pdf. 
 85 See REPORT OF NAT’L COMM’N, supra note 1, at 242. 
 86 See Leslie Turk, Angelle Back in DC on Permit Issue, INDEP. WKLY., Jan. 28, 2011, 
www.theind.com/news/7693-angelle-back-in-dc-on-permit-issue. 
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permitting that might be caused by the new rules.87 
ii.  New Rules Must Also Be Meaningfully Enforced 
New rules and regulations will not have their intended effect 
without tough, persistent and uniform enforcement. The review 
conducted by the OCS Safety and Oversight Board found numerous 
problems that have undermined the effectiveness of enforcement. In 
particular, civil penalties, capped at $35,000 per violation,88 are far lower 
than necessary to serve as an effective deterrent for an industry that pays 
between $500,000 and $1 million per day to run a facility.89  
Furthermore, the vast majority of “Incidents of Noncompliance” (INC) 
that are issued do not result in civil penalties or meaningful follow-up. 
Of the 2,298 INCs issued in 2009, only eighty-seven were referred to the 
civil penalty process, a total of $919,000 in civil penalties were collected, 
and only fifty follow-up inspections were conducted.90  Finally, lack of 
whistleblower protections has been a significant problem.91 
The OCS Safety and Oversight Board identified numerous 
disparities between oversight offices and regions. Differences include 
different protocols, program structures, and capacity between the Pacific 
Region, Gulf of Mexico Region and Alaska Region.92 Disparities also 
exist between the district offices within a single region, with the result 
that operators “shop around” for approval.93 MMS’s past malfeasance 
often occurred at the field office level.  All reforms must be designed to 
affect all levels of the restructured agency. 
Additionally, it is important to improve coordination between 
Washington and field offices and to ensure that reforms permeate 
vertically through the new regulatory structure. One step to achieve this 
would be to issue a binding directive similar to the Bureau of Land 
Management’s (BLM) recently instituted policy that requires the field 
offices to form Interdisciplinary Consistency Review Teams for lands in 
their jurisdictions and to report to the Washington office to ensure 
leasing decisions appropriately consider environmental factors and 
 87 Id. 
 88 See 43 U.S.C.A. § 1350(b) (Westlaw 2011); see also 30 C.F.R §§ 250.200-.206 (Westlaw 
2011). 
 89 OCS SAFETY OVERSIGHT REPORT, supra note 45, at 18. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. at 8-9. 
 93 Id. at 6. 
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public input.94 In August 2010, BOEMRE took a step in the right 
direction to improve the explicit code of conduct for all employees, by 
issuing new guidance to strengthen recusal for conflict of interest, reduce 
cronyism, and improve reporting industry attempts to influence or coerce 
agency action.95 
D.  INCREASE PARTICIPATION AND OVERSIGHT FROM EXTERNAL 
AGENCIES 
Although DOI interacts with multiple federal agencies in overseeing 
offshore energy activities, interagency consultation requirements are 
weak or very narrow. There is limited onus on BOEMRE to accept the 
input or expertise of natural resource agencies in planning, leasing and 
permitting under OCSLA.96 The National Commission identified the 
“need for greater interagency consultation” as a key recommendation to 
better safeguard the environment.97 The need for this change was also 
expressed by multiple experts who testified or provided written comment 
to the Commission.98 Improving substantive, and in some instances 
binding, interagency consultation is likely to have positive effects on the 
offshore oil and gas oversight regime, including improving the 
identification of the areas where oil and gas operations are acceptable 
and those “that should be excluded from lease sales because of their high 
ecological importance or sensitivity;”99 ensuring external review of 
 94 See BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., OIL AND GAS LEASING REFORM – LAND USE PLANNING 
AND LEASE PARCEL REVIEWS (May 17, 2010), available at www.blm.gov/wo/st/en/info/ 
regulations/Instruction_Memos_and_Bulletins/national_instruction/2010/IM_2010-117.html (BLM 
instruction memorandum from Director to all field offices). 
 95 See MICHAEL R. BROMWICH, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., REGULATION AND 
ENFORCEMENT, POLICY REGARDING INTERFERENCE WITH THE PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL DUTIES 
AND POTENTIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST (Aug. 30, 2010), available at 
www.boemre.gov/PDFs/Recusalmemo0830.pdf. 
 96 This Article does not focus on numerous other opportunities to improve OCSLA, for 
example, by requiring more comprehensive and effective environmental review of planning and 
leasing decisions. Existing Regulatory Structure & Consulting Agency Roles: Statutory Framework 
and Interagency Consultation & Planning: Hearing Before the National Comm. on the B.P. 
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of Margaret R. 
Caldwell), available at www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ 
MargaretCaldwellWrittenStatement.pdf; see also Memorandum from Jody Freeman, Harvard Law 
School, to Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, Structural 
Options for Improving MMS/BOEM Decision Making on Offshore Drilling (Oct. 13, 2010), 
available at www.scribd.com/doc/40642315/Jody-Freeman-Presentation-on-Structural-Options-for-
MMS-BOEM. 
 97 See REPORT OF NAT’L COMM’N, supra note 1, at 262-63. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
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agency decisions, which will help balance consideration of DOI’s 
multiple mandates (i.e., environmental protection versus revenue 
maximization); improving resource sharing; enhancing exchange of 
scientific information; and saving money or increasing efficiency 
through cost and staff sharing.100 
There are consultation requirements throughout the multi-staged 
OCSLA leasing program. The Secretary of the Interior “shall invite and 
consider suggestions for such program from any interested Federal 
agency, including the Attorney General, in consultation with the Federal 
Trade Commission, and from the Governor of any State which may 
become an affected State under such proposed program.”101 Although the 
Secretary must reply to the state’s requests “in writing, granting or 
denying such request in whole or in part,” and must similarly respond to 
the Attorney General on comments regarding anti-trust matters, there is 
no obligation for other agencies to comment or for DOI to respond or 
incorporate comments received. 102 
Consultation requirements of other environmental statutes 
(including the Clean Air Act and the Endangered Species Act) also 
require BOEMRE to confer with federal agencies charged with marine 
resource protection: the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA), the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS), and U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), all of which possess significant scientific data 
and expertise on ecosystems and wildlife in the OCS.103 
The OCS Safety Oversight Panel identified the need for better 
resource sharing between BOEMRE and the other agencies: “In addition 
to its own legal mandates, BOEMRE conducts inspections for the EPA 
on air quality and point-source discharges, for the USCG on safety, and 
for the Department of Transportation on pipelines – all without 
reimbursement.”104 BOEMRE also shares responsibility for oversight of 
offshore oil and gas activities with the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), which 
has oversight responsibility for the safety of systems at the platform level 
of mobile offshore drilling unit (MODU), while BOEMRE oversees sub-
platform drilling systems.105 Despite a 2004 Memorandum of 
 100 Statement of Margaret R. Caldwell, supra note 96; see also Memorandum from Jody 
Freeman, supra note 96. 
 101 43 U.S.C.A. § 1344(c)(1) (Westlaw 2011). 
 102 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1337(c)(2), (d)(2) (Westlaw 2011). 
 103 See Memorandum from Jody Freeman, supra note 96. 
 104 OCS SAFETY OVERSIGHT REPORT, supra note 45, at 13. 
 105 See 43 U.S.C.A. § 1337(p) (Westlaw 2011); see also HAGERTY & RAMSEUR, supra note 
10, at 13. 
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Understanding between MMS and the USCG “to promote interagency 
consistency in the regulation of OCS activities and facilities under the 
jurisdiction” of both agencies,106 better coordination is also necessary in 
order to facilitate unannounced inspections.107 
To achieve improved interagency coordination, the National 
Commission and other experts recommended the OCSLA be amended to 
designate NOAA, which has science and marine resource expertise and 
responsibilities, as a cooperating agency for the purposes of National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) compliance under OCSLA.108 
Improvements could also be made by clarifying and strengthening 
interagency consultation with NOAA, EPA, NMFS, and USFWS, 
requiring that BOEMRE consult with these agencies and respond to input 
in writing.109 
An augmented role for other natural resources agencies and 
independent science entities will help ensure development of regulations 
and enable their implementation and enforcement to be robust and free 
from industry influence. In particular, NOAA, as the lead federal agency 
with knowledge and jurisdiction over coastal and marine ecosystems, 
should be given a much stronger role in preparation of Environmental 
Impact Statement and related NEPA documents, even beyond the status 
of a co-operating agency.110 Congress could also consider amending the 
OCSLA to accord NOAA further deference, particularly at the planning 
and leasing stages of OCS review. 
To improve external oversight of all aspects of offshore oil and gas 
oversight, periodic reviews should also conducted by external entities, 
such as the National Academies of Sciences and Engineering.111 
Additional oversight by agencies outside of DOI might also be pursued 
for the development of certain standards and regulations. For example, 
 106 MINERALS MGMT. SERV. & U.S. COAST GUARD, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 
BETWEEN THE MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE – U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND THE 
U.S. COAST GUARD – U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Sep. 30, 2004), available at 
www.boemre.gov/regcompliance/MOU/cgmoufnl.htm. This MOU was entered into under the 
authority of 14 U.S.C.A. § 141 (Westlaw 2011) (Coast Guard cooperation with other agencies); 
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), as amended, 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1347, 1348(a) (Westlaw 
2011); Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2712 (a)(5)(A) (Westlaw 2011); and 
Submerged Lands Act (SLA), as amended, 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301-1315 (Westlaw 2011). 
 107 OCS SAFETY OVERSIGHT REPORT, supra note 45, at 9 (conducting a survey of 400 
BOEMRE employees, finding that 90% of inspectors responding to the survey identified a critical 
need for more unannounced inspections, which were rarely performed because of the requirements 
of the Coast Guard to satisfy its Maritime Security Plan). 
 108 See REPORT OF NAT’L COMM’N, supra note 1, at 264. 
 109 See Statement of Margaret R. Caldwell, supra note 96. 
 110 See REPORT OF NAT’L COMM’N, supra note 1, at 264. 
 111 Id. 
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the development of new safety standards and regulations could be 
advised or reviewed by the National Academy of Engineering, which the 
President has tasked with conducting an independent, technical 
investigation to determine the root mechanical and technical causes of 
the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster.112 
V. CONCLUSION 
In the wake of the BP Deepwater Horizon catastrophe, tremendous 
effort has been dedicated by external and government experts to 
determining the failings in management and oversight that allowed the 
accident to occur. Various reviews made clear that deep and systemic 
problems with the federal oversight structure were contributing causes 
and that there are clear opportunities to make permanent, lasting 
improvements to address these problems. Identification of necessary 
reforms is only the first step to reforming management and oversight of 
U.S. offshore oil and gas exploration and production. Now, sustained 
commitment is needed from both the Administration and Congress to 
ensure that these reforms are meaningfully implemented. There is 
indication that industry and political forces are endeavoring to undermine 
such implementation. 
The Obama Administration has taken significant steps to address 
problems with government oversight, but this action must be sustained 
and supported by funding and legislative action from Congress. In 
August 2010, the U.S. House of Representatives passed H.R. 3534, the 
CLEAR Act, which sought to implement many of the reforms that were 
identified by the National Commission and many expert reviewers that 
have been analyzed in this Article.113 Those included codification of 
MMS restructuring, with the creation of an independent science office to 
conduct NEPA reviews; amendments to OCSLA that would have 
required enhanced consultation with NOAA; establishment of stronger 
safety standards; and numerous other provisions that would have 
addressed oil spill liability and funding for restoration and numerous 
other deficiencies not covered by this Article. There was insufficient 
Senate support to pass the bill out of Congress. Since release of the Final 
Report in January 2011, members of the National Commission have 
 112 See NAT’L ACAD. OF ENG’G AND NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., 
INTERIM REPORT ON CAUSES OF THE DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL RIG BLOWOUT AND WAYS TO 
PREVENT SUCH EVENTS (Nov. 16 2010), available at www.nationalacademies.org/includes/ 
DH_Interim_Report_final.pdf. 
 113 See Consolidated Land, Energy, and Aquatic Resources Act of 2009, H.R. 3534, 111th 
Cong. § 101 (2009). 
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testified before Congress to explicitly request legislative action to 
implement recommendations of the report, but a highly contentious 
political climate will make passage of such legislation very 
challenging.114 
 
 114 See Prepared Joint Testimony for Commission Co-Chairs Bob Graham and William 
Reilly: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 112th Cong. (2011) 
(statement of Bob Graham and William Reilly, Co-Chairs, Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater 
Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling), available at www.oilspillcommission.gov/page/prepared-
joint-testimony-commission-co-chairs-bob-graham-and-william-reilly-senate-committee-en. 
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